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Abstract
This paper investigates prices and endogenous research decision
for ￿nancial assets. In rational expectations models with public in-
formation, higher order beliefs make the investors to overweight the
public information relative to underlying fundamentals. The extent of
this mispricing is higher if the of private signals is relatively high. The
model presented in this paper extends this setting by incorporating
the research cost decision and essentially endogenises the variance of
private signals of short-lived investors obtain in each period. It turns
out that investors will be less willing to research in periods when there
is an alternative with high return available. Furthermore, the optimal
research decision will depend on the time left until the maturity of
asset. This explains in a rational setting why long lived assets like
stocks may be traded based on the public information rather than
research on fundamentals.
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11 Introduction
This paper aims to address some ￿nancial markets imperfections in a rational
setting. It incorporates the need for heterogeneous market participants to
pay attention to the average expectations of the market in addition to their
private information. The model investigates the optimal research e⁄ort and
its implications on asset prices. In particular, it illustrates the dependence
of the research e⁄ort on the maturity of assets and the impact of alternative
returns.
The view among investors seems to be that they would not necessarily
"go against market sentiment" based on their internal fundamental research
only. A paper by Menkho⁄(1998) presents results of a survey among the par-
ticipants of the foreign exchange market in Germany. The respondents were
asked to evaluate the relative importance of fundamentals, technical analysis
and monitoring order ￿ ows in their trading decisions. The importance of
fundamental research was evaluated to be around 45 per cent. The survey
also shows that investors consider psychological in￿ uences and importance
of opinion leaders relevant to the market.
Allen, Morris and Shin (2004) investigate the impact of average beliefs
and existence of public signals in a dynamic rational expectations model with
a single risky asset. In their model, short-lived investors have noisy public
information and heterogeneous private information about the fundamental
value of the asset (that is, the liquidation value at the ￿nal period). Taking
into account the higher order beliefs (that is, beliefs about other investors
beliefs), asset prices will be systematically biased towards the public sig-
nal. This is because the public signal still contains information about the
fundamental value, so all investors take it into account when forming their
expectations. While noise in private signals averages out at the aggregate
level, noise in public information does not. This bias will be larger the higher
the variance of private signals. Furthermore, the bias will be larger the more
time is left until investors receive the liquidation value.
This paper adopts largely the setting of Allen, Morris and Shin (2004).
The additions are the existence of an alternative asset and the endogenous
research cost decision. Investors can do fundamental research on the true
value of a risky asset. There are three things to note. First, no analyst
would be capable of knowing the true value of a risky asset without an error,
and di⁄erent investors are heterogeneous in their estimates about the true
value. Second, having an individual view about the true value is costly.
2A ￿nancial market institution must have a research department and they
can choose the size and research e⁄ort in it. Although it is not explicitly
modelled in this paper, the research cost can also be thought as investors
losing time by trying to ￿nd out more about the true value of asset. Instead
they can put their e⁄ort on investing on the spot. Last, as argued before, it
is not rational for investors to make their investment decision based on their
fundamental research only. This is because they need to take into account
their expectations about other market participants￿expectations. The extent
of how much they rely on their fundamental research compared to the public
signal depends on the variance of their private signal. Therefore, the optimal
research cost e⁄ort can be modelled as a choice of optimal variance of the
private signal. The paper investigates the determinants of optimal research
costs.
One question that this paper aims to address, is how the optimal research
cost changes over time and how it will depend on the maturity of the asset.
For example, it may be argued that fundamental research, especially on long
lasting assets like stocks, has a reputation of being more of a marketing tool
than an important determinant of trading decisions in the market. It is
interesting to analyse whether it can be rational to spend less resources on
fundamental research of such assets. If this is the case then such assets are
more likely to be mispriced.
The second question relates to alternative returns. One can expect that
if there is a less risky alternative asset available, and if such asset o⁄ers
a high return, investors may choose to do less research on the risky asset.
For example, if we think of the risky asset being a portfolio of assets in
emerging markets, extraordinarily good returns in developed countries assets
may reduce the incentives to research emerging markets assets. If we think
of investors behaviour during the Asian crisis vs. the Turkish or Argentine
crises, investors seem to react more heavily on the negative news in the ￿rst
rather than in the latter, across all emerging markets. Indeed, if we compare
the returns in developed countries asset markets during these periods, we see
that during the Asian crisis the MSCI Europe and North American equity
indices o⁄ered average annualised monthly returns of 32.6 and 21.9 per cent
respectively (in USD prices). On the contrary, during the Turkish crisis these
returns were -14.5 and -10.2 per cent, while during the Argentine crisis they
were -4.7 and -5.8 per cent respectively. Another way of looking at it may
be comparing the research on stocks depending on the returns of commercial
bonds, or research on commercial papers depending on returns of government
bonds etc. It is also interesting to analyse how research decisions would
3depend on permanently or temporarily higher alternative asset returns.
The paper presents a rational expectations model where a continuum of
risk averse investors can invest in a risky asset and an alternative asset. The
risky asset has a single liquidation value in T + 1 and is traded in periods
1 to T by short-lived rational agents. Investors are heterogeneous in the
trading stage, because they receive di⁄erent noisy private signals. Investors
are homogeneous in their research cost decisions, because these will be made
before each trading period and before receiving individual private signals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 presents the model for the general T period case, which can only
be solved numerically. It also analyses the more tractable case of one trading
period. Section 4 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Calvo and Mendoza (1999) focus on herding behaviour due to information
costs. They analyse portfolio choice with both ￿xed costs and manager￿ s
di⁄erent marginal costs from over or under-performing the market return.
They analyse the incentives to research a particular asset instead of believing
a rumour about it. In contrast to the current paper, their assumptions are
about asset returns and the model lacks market clearing. They also assume
short selling constraints and focus on the negative impact of globalisation.
The latter is due to the fact that if investors have more assets available, they
have lower incentives to spend resources in order to reduce portfolio variance,
by ￿nding out more about one particular asset.
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) aim to explain the empirical evi-
dence of under-reaction of stock prices on news about companies￿earnings
and overreaction on series of good or bad news. They base it on evidence from
psychology, and they have a model where the representative investor prices
assets incorrectly. Namely, the investor assumes that earnings follow one
of two regimes, a trend stationary or a mean reverting process, while earn-
ings are actually a random walk. Therefore this model has a component of
irrationality in investors beliefs. Allen, Morris and Shin (2004) explain over-
reaction of stock prices to noisy public information by heterogeneous private
information of investors and higher order beliefs, in a fully rational setting.
Their model has a similar setup to this paper, but does not analyse what
4the investors￿incentives to collect private information depend on. Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2004) also analyse the impact of higher order expectations
on asset prices. They ￿nd that an additional term in standard asset pricing
formulation (the higher order wedge) disconnects the price from the present
value of future pay-o⁄s. They show that this e⁄ect can be quantitatively
signi￿cant.
The aforementioned models are based on the earlier rational expectations
literature. Grossman (1976), Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981)
present static models and derive the rational equilibrium, when investors can
infer information from prices. Grossman (1976) points out how prices must
contain a noise component, otherwise they would be fully revealing and, as
long as private information gathering has a positive cost, no-one would have
an incentive to collect it. Admati (1985) extends these models to a static
multiple asset model. Singleton (1986), Grundy and McNichols (1989), He
and Wang (1995) extend the rational expectations models into a dynamic
context. Compared to Allen, Morris and Shin (2004) these models do not
emphasize the bias in asset prices caused by the higher order beliefs.
3 The model
Investors can invest in a risky asset and in an alternative asset. The alter-
native asset provides a known risk-free return rt ￿ 1, on each trading period
t. The risky asset has liquidation value ￿ at date T + 1, and is traded on
periods 1 to T. Investors do not know the liquidation value, but they can
obtain information about it from public signals, private signals and prices.
The characteristics of these signals will be described later in this section.
The model uses the assumption of overlapping generations of traders.
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it emphasizes the behaviour of in-
vestors who care about short-term price movements in addition to the fun-
damental value of asset. As pointed out by Allen, Morris and Shin (2004),
investors would care about short term price movements, if they wanted to
smooth their consumption. Furthermore, if we think of an asset management
￿rm, the short horizon seems plausible. Traders working there are profes-
sionals having to present the performance of the fund to their clients with
some regularity and the short term prices of assets in their portfolio matter.
Secondly, this assumption simpli￿es the model by allowing investors to be
homogeneous in their research decision. It has to be pointed out that this
5assumption excludes investors possible gain from their private fundamental
research done in earlier periods. As shown later, the research done in early
periods matters, only to the extent that it is revealed in the prices of later
periods.
There is a continuum of rational investors normalized in the interval [0;1],
endowed with w units of funds. These investors buy assets at date t and
consume at date t + 1. A risk averse investor i, who is trading at date t has
the mean-variance utility function




where the risk aversion is measured by the constant ￿.
The budget constraint for investor i trading on period t is
ci;t+1 = hi;t(Pt+1 ￿ rtPt) + rtw ￿ rt￿(￿i;t);
where ci;t+1 is his consumption at t+1, hi;t is his demand for the risky asset
and ￿(￿i;t) is the research cost function, which will be speci￿ed later. The
price of the risky asset at time t is denoted by Pt. Note also that PT+1 = ￿.
In addition to rational traders, there are noise traders in each period,
modelled as a noisy net supply of the risky asset st ￿ N[0;1=￿]. Supply
shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated along time and across both public
and private signals of investors in every time period. The market clearing
condition is Ht = st for every period t, where Ht is the aggregate demand.
There is some initial public information about the risky assets. The
liquidation value is drawn from the prior distribution ￿ ￿ N [y;1=￿]. The
normality assumptions allow straightforward updating of investors￿beliefs
and are standard in the literature.
Investors trading on period t can obtain a costly and noisy private signal
about the fundamental value of the asset, xi;t = ￿ + "i;t, "i;t ￿ N[0;1=￿i;t].
It is assumed that "i;t is uncorrelated across investors, along time and with
the supply shocks and the noise in public signal.
Investors can choose the variance of their private signal (1=￿i;t), if they
spend ￿(￿i;t) on research. The research cost function should capture the
idea that having a more precise view about the fundamental value must be
more expensive, and knowing the true value with certainty is too expensive.
This implies the following conditions: ￿0(￿) > 0, ￿(￿) ! 1 as ￿ ! 1 and
￿(0) = 0.
6The sequence of events is the following:
1) The fundamental value ￿ is drawn by nature at date 0.
2) The ￿rst generation of investors simultaneously choose their research
cost for the risky asset, before receiving the private signals and observing the
price. The information set about fundamentals available to each of them is
the same: I￿1 = fyg.
3) These investors trade and the period 1 market clears. The information
available for their trading decision now contains the private signals and the
price signal. So, Ii;1 = fy;xi;1;P1g. In the following period, they will receive
income corresponding to the price of each asset, consume and die without
revealing their private signals to the following generations.
4) The generations 2 to T will make their research and trading decisions
in a similar manner. The only di⁄erence is that they will obtain information
about the fundamental also from historical prices. Hence, the information set
available for their research decision is I￿t = fy;P1;:::;Pt￿1g. Their trading
decisions will be based on the information set Ii;t = fI￿t;xi;t;Ptg. Apart
from the generation trading at T, the consumption of investors will depend
on prices at t + 1 rather than on the fundamental value ￿.
5) At T +1 the risky asset will be liquidated and generation T will obtain
￿.
This setting implies that investors are heterogeneous in their trading de-
cisions, while being homogeneous in their research decision.
3.1 Solving the model
Investors of each generation face a two stage decision problem. The model is
solved by ￿rst deriving investors￿demand and equilibrium prices, taking the
research decisions as given. Given the solution from that stage, the optimal
research costs can be derived conditional on the available information.







Assume that the asset price follows a linear rule on each period, Pt = ￿t(￿tyt+
￿t￿ ￿ st). The term yt is the public signal about the asset at period t. It
7includes the initial public signal y and the information from prices in trading
periods 1 to t ￿ 1. The coe¢ cients ￿t; ￿t; ￿t can be found by the method of
undetermined coe¢ cients from the market clearing condition. (See Appendix
A for the derivation.)
Rearranging the pricing equation, investors can observe a price signal




￿1]. The updated distribution of ￿ conditional on prices will also
be normal. It will be the public signal for the investors trading in period
t + 1: ￿jAt ￿ N[yt+1;￿
￿1






￿t+1 = ￿t + ￿
2
t￿: (4)
The ￿rst generation investors cannot observe historical prices, so
￿1 = ￿ and y1 = y: (5)
As investors trading in period t will also obtain a private signal xi;t, they













In equilibrium, all investors of the same generation will choose the same
research cost, that is, ￿i;t = ￿t for all i. This is because, by assumption,
investors are identical in their preferences and base their research decision
on the same information I￿t. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium, all
investors would have chosen the same optimal research cost, taking everyone
else￿ s research decision as given.
Aggregating the demand of all investors averages out the noise in the
private signals. However, it does not average out the noise in the public
signal.
Proposition 1 The prices in period t will be determined by coe¢ cients zt
and zs;t, so that
Pt =
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This is similar to Allen, Morris and Shin (2004) with the addition of
the discount factor. Integrating out the noisy supply, asset prices will be
a weighted average of the true value and the public signal for the relevant
period. (For a proof of these expressions, see Appendix A.)
On period T + 1 the risky asset will be liquidated at the fundamental
value. Also, there will be no more opportunities to invest in the risk-free
asset. So, the terminal conditions will be
zT+1 = 1, zs;T+1 = 0 and rT+1 = 1: (9)
Finally, comparing the pricing equation (6) with the linear pricing rule as-





The dynamic system (3)-(5) and (7)-(10) solves for the values of zt and zs;t,
given the values of ￿1to ￿T.
93.1.2 The research decision
The optimal research cost decision is equivalent to choosing ￿i;t taking other
investor￿ s ￿j;t, j 6= i as given. Assume the research cost function is ￿(￿i;t) =
K￿
2
i;t=4, where the constant K measures how expensive the research is. Re-
placing the optimal demand into the utility function, simplifying and taking












By doing research, investors can gain a reduction in the variance of their
estimated next period price. They can also gain a better view about risky
return opportunities. Given that investors are allowed to short sell, they can
gain equally from either an increase or a decrease in the next period price.

















It is obvious from the equation above that the variance of expected price
should be lower if investor i decides to research a lot (￿i;t is high) and if the
weight on the fundamental value (zt+1) in the next period pricing equation
is high.
Investors face additional sources of uncertainty about the expected return
of the risky asset at the research decision stage, compared to the trading
stage. They do not know the realization of their private signal, as well as the
price signal they can observe at t. By doing research, they can in￿ uence the
variance of the private signal. The only information they have about the fun-
damental value is the public signal yt. Noting that Ei[xi;tjI￿t] = Ei[AtjI￿t] =
Ei[￿jI￿t] = yt, it is easy to show that Ei[(Ei[Pt+1jIi;t] ￿ rtPt)jIn;￿t] = 0.
Thus, the expected squared return from the risky asset equals its variance.
Derivation of the variance term is presented in the Appendix B.
When deriving the ￿rst order conditions, the terms zt, zs;t, and ￿t are
taken as given. These do depend on the market ￿t, but an individual investor
is too small to in￿ uence it. After taking the ￿rst order conditions, we can
10impose a symmetric equilibrium where ￿i;t = ￿t. Replacing in the expressions
for zt and zs;t and simplifying, the optimal ￿t is shown to be
Krt￿t =












s;t+1(￿t+1 + ￿t) + z2
t+1￿)2:
The dynamic system of equations (10), (11) can be solved with respect
to f￿1;:::;￿T;￿1;:::;￿Tg numerically (using also (4), (5), (7),(8) and (9)).
The numerical results are presented in Appendix D and analysed in Section
3.3.
3.2 One trading period example
Before discussing the numerical results for the multiple trading period case,
consider the one trading period model. For T = 1 the solution of the model
simpli￿es substantially. In such case, z2 = 1 and zs;2 = 0, the value of ￿1 can
be found from (7),(8) and (10) to be ￿1 = ￿1=￿. The intuition behind this
is the following. If the variance of the private signals is higher, prices will
be more informative, for a given level of noise in supply. Prices will be more
informative also if risk aversion is lower, since rational investors will invest
more in risky assets.
Replacing z2, zs;2, ￿1 and knowing that ￿2 = ￿1 + ￿2
1￿, with ￿1 = ￿, the
equation for the optimal research cost (11) simpli￿es to
Kr1￿1 =












In the one trading period case, the sensitivity of ￿1 with respect to the
parameters of the model can be shown analytically. The implicit derivatives
of ￿1 are reported in the Appendix C.
Investors will choose less precise private signals, if research is expensive
(K is high). They will also research less if the information available for free
is more accurate. This is the case, when the variance of the public signal
is low, or when the variance of supply is low, causing price signals to be
11more revealing. The dependence of the research decision on risk aversion is
more ambiguous. There are three forces a⁄ecting it in di⁄erent directions.
First, a higher risk aversion makes the investors to care more about reducing
the variance, which they can achieve this by research. Second, more risk
averse investors are less willing to invest in risky assets in the ￿rst place,
and therefore have less incentives to research instead of investing in the risk-
free asset. Finally, higher risk aversion makes the demand of other rational
investors in the risky assets lower, making prices less informative, which again
increases the incentives to research. In very high and very low levels of risk
aversion, the optimal research cost is increasing in risk aversion.
A higher risk-free return reduces the optimal research cost. This con-
￿rms the hypothesis that investors are less willing to research if there are
good alternatives available. It is assumed that knowing the return of such
alternative does not to require research e⁄ort. Therefore, instead of spending
resources and trying to ￿nd out more about assets in the risky category, they
invest more to the less risky alternative.










which is clearly decreasing in ￿1. This means that prices are expected to
be closer to the common public signal, if less research is chosen. Hence, if
investors choose to research less, a "good" risky asset is likely to be under-
priced and a "bad" asset overpriced. An asset being "good" ("bad") in this
context is an asset with true value above (below) y.
Consider the following example illustrating the impact of alternative re-
turn. Assume y = 1, ￿ = 2:5, ￿ = 6, ￿ = 2:5, and K = 0:05. The high
alternative return is r1 = 1:2 and the low return r1 = 1. The value for K
is chosen such that it gives ￿1 around 2:5, for the low r1 case. These values
aim to match those in Bacchetta and Wincoop (2004). Integrating out the
noise in the supply, it should hold that r1P1 = ￿. However, the information
structure makes the risky asset price biased towards the public signal; that
is, as argued before, r1P1 = (1￿z1)y +z1￿ for s1 = 0. Assume that an asset
has true liquidation value ￿ = 1:2 and the mean of the public signal y = 1. If
the alternative return is low, then r1P1 = 1:11, which is lower than the one
corresponding to the true value. High alternative return reduces incentives
to research and makes the prices even more biased towards the public mean
and r1P1 = 1:10.
123.3 Numerical results
Since the T trading periods case is too complicated to analyse analytically, an
example with T = 7 is presented. The baseline case has the same parameter
values as the previous subsection, with the exception that K is chosen such
that ￿4 is close to 2:5. This can be achieved by K = 0:005. In the baseline
case the alternative interest rates are constant at 1. The arbitrary form of
the research cost function assumed, and the fact that the alternative return is
modelled as risk-free, imply that the numerical results should be interpreted
with caution. The objective is to present the direction of impact of various
parameters in the model.
The results of the numerical solution are presented in Appendix D. Sim-
ilarly to the one trading period case, the research costs in all periods are
increasing in higher noise in supply and public signal. Both, higher variance
of supply and public signal make investors to spend more on research in order
to compensate for less information in costlessly available signals. The high
variance in public signal also sets the expected prices closer to the funda-
mental. It is clear that if research is more expensive (higher K), investors
choose a higher variance for their private signals in all periods.
As in the one trading period example, the impact of the risk aversion on
optimal research in some period t is ambiguous. In the numerical example
presented, it reduces research in later periods, while increasing it in earlier
periods. However, it is interesting to notice that it makes the weight on
the supply noise term in the pricing equation (6) lower in all periods. It
also makes prices closer to the fundamental in all periods, due to the higher
participation of rational investors in the market.
In the following subsections we concentrate on the main questions of the
paper: the development of research incentives over time and the impact of
alternative returns on the research decision.
3.3.1 Development of research incentives over time and its impact
on investors willingness to separate assets in a category.
As shown already in Allen, Morris and Shin (2004), the existence of pub-
lic and heterogeneous private signals makes asset prices to react slowly to
changes in the underlying fundamental. The numerical results show that
allowing investors to make their research decision endogenously makes asset
13prices even more similar in earlier periods. That is due to earlier periods in-
vestors lower incentives to research; reasons for this will be analysed shortly.
(The numerical results are presented in the Appendix D.)
Figure 1 provides an illustration of this e⁄ect. The dashed line represents
the expected price of the asset, if it was traded according to the fundamental.
The dotted line shows the asset price development over time, due to the
information structure only (similarly to Allan, Morris and Shin, 2004). This
is if the research cost is assumed constant over time (at their period T ￿ 1
level in endogenous research cost case). Finally, the solid line presents prices
when the research decision is taken endogenously. The alternative return is
assumed to be constant at rt = 1, for all t.
Figure 1
We can see that even if research e⁄ort is constant over time, the more
long-lived assets would be priced more towards the public signal mean. En-
dogenous research decision makes this mispricing even stronger, because in
earlier trading periods investors have lower incentives to research.
Thinking of long-lasting assets like stocks in the light of these ￿ndings
rationalises the investors￿unwillingness to trade such assets based on the
information from internal fundamental research. It is not rational to "go
against the market" following internal fundamental research. It is also not
optimal to spend a lot of resources on fundamental research of such assets,
14since imprecise public information can make asset prices to be persistently
far from the fundamental.
Furthermore, fundamental research may be more useful as a tool for in-
￿ uencing the public information, which can justify the reputation of such
research as a marketing tool. However, analysing this question in depth is
out of the scope of this paper.
The reasons for lower incentives for research in earlier periods are the
following. As we can see in the Appendix D, the weight on the true value
(zt) in the pricing equation (6) is increasing over time time. So, given that
period t traders care about the next period price rather than the true value,
earlier periods investors can ￿nd out about a smaller component of next
period￿ s expected price by doing fundamental research. In addition to that,
the coe¢ cient on noise in supply (zs;t) is decreasing over time. Therefore,
earlier periods investors also face higher uncertainty due to noise trading
and they cannot reduce this uncertainty by fundamental research. These
two forces reduce earlier periods investors￿marginal gains from research.
However, there is an opposite force a⁄ecting the incentive to research; the
availability of price history. As long as at least some research is done in earlier
periods, the variance of the public signals (evolving according to (4) and (5))
decreases over time, because historical prices carry information about the
fundamental. As shown before, a lower variance of the public signal reduces
investors￿willingness to spend resources on research. Therefore this force
lowers the incentive to research for investors, who have longer price history
in their information set i.e. the later period ones. Nevertheless, this force
does not appear to be strong enough to make the later period investors to
research as little as earlier period ones.
The result of less research in earlier periods seems robust. Constant or
decreasing research cost over time could be the solution only if the alternative
interest rates would be less than 1 in earlier periods. Such alternative returns
are not feasible, given that there is always at least cash available with nominal
return of 1.
Returning to the impact of a longer price history, we can notice another
feature. If two assets have the same time to maturity, while one of them has
a longer price history available, the prices of the latter will not necessarily be
closer to the fundamental. This is despite of the fact that for the latter asset
there is more information available. Table 1 illustrates by this comparing the










Baseline 6:851 6:948 1:161 1:161
￿ = 1:5 7:171 7:298 1:176 1:176
￿ = 1:5 8:199 8:261 1:163 1:163
￿ = 3 5:375 5:797 1:174 1:172
K = 0:0075 5:848 5:904 1:154 1:154
The baseline values are assumed to be the same as in Appendix D.
Fundamental value of the risky assets is ￿ = 1:2.
Table 1: The impact of existence of price history on optimal variance and
prices
and those in the 7th trading period in T = 7 case. In both cases, there is one
period remaining until maturity. It appears that the prices (integrating out
the noise in supply) for assets with longer price history are not necessarily
closer to the fundamental. This is because in such case investors will choose
to research less, obtain more information from historical prices and in e⁄ect
free-ride on the research done in earlier periods.
3.3.2 Impact of alternative returns on incentives to research
We will now consider the impact of alternative returns in a dynamic setting.
As we can see from the tables in Appendix D, a temporary increase of the
alternative return reduces research on that period, and makes investors invest
more in the alternative. In the periods following the temporary increase,
investors will choose to research a bit more compared to the baseline case.
This is because they have to compensate for the worse price signals from the
earlier trading periods.
Using the example of Section 1, during the Asian crisis investors might
have put less research e⁄ort in emerging markets because of lower incentives
to research. This may have been because they could invest easily to less risky
alternative assets and reacted on the general negative public signal due to
crisis in some countries. This is consistent with the model predictions, if we
consider the alternative being assets in developed countries.
A permanently higher alternative return reduces research in all periods. A
temporarily higher return in some period also reduces research in all periods
preceding it. The latter is due to the assumption that alternative returns in
each period are known to the investors. In such case, earlier period investors
16know that their consumption will depend on prices that are expected to
be further from the fundamental. This in turn, is due to the later periods
investors￿higher reluctance to invest into research.
4 Conclusions
This paper presented a model where investors make optimally their trading
decisions according to both public and private information. Adding the en-
dogenous research decision to a model in the style of Allen, Morris and Shin
(2004) leads to following conclusions.
First, as already shown by the above mentioned paper, the existence
of a public signal makes asset prices biased towards it. This is because all
investors take into account their expectations about other investors￿expecta-
tions and everyone observes the public signal. Furthermore, this bias will be
larger if investors trade assets that have more time left to maturity. Allowing
investors to choose the variance of their private signal increases this bias in
earlier periods even more. Namely, investors that trade with more long-lived
assets can gain less from their private fundamental research, because of the
higher uncertainty of returns from risky assets caused by noise trading in fol-
lowing periods. Furthermore, given that investors care more about the price
that they will get for their assets in the market when exiting, rather than the
underlying fundamentals, their incentive to research is lower the earlier they
trade compared to the maturity date of their assets. This justi￿es the lack
of relevance of internal fundamental research in the research decisions about
long-lived assets, like stocks. It provides scope for the prices of such assets
to be persistently far from the ones corresponding to fundamentals only.
Second, for a ￿xed time to maturity, a longer price history does not make
asset prices necessarily closer to the ones corresponding to fundamentals.
This is because investors, who can obtain more information from historical
prices, will have an incentive to research less and free-ride on the research
e⁄ort made by the earlier trading period investors.
Finally, temporarily higher alternative returns reduce investors￿incentives
to research. Instead, they prefer to save some of the research cost and invest
more into the alternative asset. If the alternative returns were to fall after
that, then later periods￿investors would be more willing to research, in order
to compensate for the worse signals coming from asset prices. Hence, in
17the circumstances where there are some assets in the global market o⁄ering
unusually high returns with low risk, then the riskier assets are likely to be
researched very little.
The paper could be extended in multiple directions. The short lived
traders assumption overlooks the possible gain investors can obtain from re-
searching in earlier periods. Namely, if they were trading also in the following
period, they could gain from their own research done in earlier periods. On
the other hand, the model presented overlooks another opposite force, com-
ing from a possible feedback from prices to the fundamental. For example,
a company that has its stock underpriced, may ￿nd it harder to get loans to
￿nance its projects and its fundamental value may be damaged. If there were
a possibility of the fundamental changing due to prices, investors￿incentives
to spend on research in early periods, should be lower again.
Furthermore, the assumptions about the information structure could be
extended as well. There could be incentives for investors to try to manipulate
the public signals. However, this would require a much more complicated
setting, in which one would need to consider the resulting agency problems.
Finally, this model is too stylized to allow for an assessment of the quanti-
tative signi￿cance of these e⁄ects. This is because of the simplifying assump-
tions regarding the functional form of research cost, and the assumption
that alternative asset is risk-free. Hence, it would be interesting to develop a
framework that would allow for empirical investigation of the magnitude of
the e⁄ects of the various parameters in the model.
18A Derivation of the equilibrium price equa-
tion
Consider an investor of generation T. His demand for the risky asset is
hi;T = (Ei[￿jIi;T] ￿ rtPT)=￿Vi(￿jIi;T).




T￿AT + ￿i;Txi;T ￿ rTPT(￿T + ￿2
T￿ + ￿i;T)):
Aggregating this across investors, and noting that in the symmetric equilib-
rium ￿i;T = ￿T, the aggregate demand will be
HT = 1
￿(yT￿T + ￿2
T￿AT + ￿T￿ ￿ rTPT(￿T + ￿2
T￿ + ￿T)):
Equating supply and demand, replacing in AT = ￿￿HT=￿T and rearranging
















































Next, we show that for any trading period t, where in the next trading











we can ￿nd zt and zs;t such that we can form a similar pricing equation.
Investors trading at t will know the value of yt+1 as it incorporates the
price signals for periods 1 to t. The expected value and variance of the next















Replacing in the conditional expectations, variance and the public signal and






















t￿ + ￿t) + z2
s;t+1=￿
:
Equating this to supply and rearranging, there will be zt and zs (equations
(7) and (8) respectively), such that the pricing equation (6) can be formed.











Explicit expressions for ￿t, ￿t and ￿t cannot be derived for t < T.
It is easy to see that replacing in the terminal conditions zT+1 = 1,
zs;T+1 = 0 and rT+1 = 1, (7) and (8) also simplify to the expressions zT and
zs;T derived.
B Derivation of the expected squared return
of risky asset at the research decision stage
Using the pricing equation (6) and conditional expectations of the true value,
the expected return of the risky asset for investor i can be expressed as














Rt+1 [(1 ￿ zt)yt + zt￿ ￿ ztst]:
The public signal is At = ￿ ￿ st=￿t and the private signal xi;t = ￿ + "i;t.




























t￿"i;t + a non stochastic term wrt. I￿t
i
:
20Since Vi["i;tjI￿t] = 1=￿i;t, Vi[stjI￿t] = 1=￿ and Vi[￿jI￿t] = 1=￿t, the variance


































C The dependence of optimal precision of the
private signal on the parameters of the model
in one trading period case
Assume that ￿;￿t;￿;￿;K;rt > 0, and denote













The implicit derivatives from (12), of optimal precision ￿1with respect to the




































1 + ￿1￿6 + ￿
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The direction of impact from risk aversion to optimal precision of private
signal is ambiguous, depending on the parameters of the model. ￿1 will be
increasing in ￿ for small values of ￿, may be decreasing in ￿ in a small area
in the middle, and is increasing in ￿ again in high values of ￿.
21D Numerical results for the T = 7 model
Baseline parameters: y = 1, ￿ = 2:5, ￿ = 6, ￿ = 2:5, K = 0:005 and
rt = 1, for all t. In order for the results to be more intuitive, the supply is





rkPt (P8 = ￿), to be more easily comparable for di⁄erent levels of
rt.
Table D1. Optimal precision of private signal: ￿t (research cost is
proportional ￿t).
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Baseline :001 :187 1:106 2:434 3:957 5:569 6:851
￿ = 1:5 1:692 2:583 3:505 4:448 5:461 6:478 7:171
￿ = 1:5 :093 :854 2:125 3:569 5:112 6:777 8:199
￿ = 3 :012 :444 1:648 3:013 4:057 4:705 5:375
K = 0:0075 :000 :010 :394 1:490 2:906 4:487 5:848
r6 = 1:2 :000 :035 :610 1:810 3:294 5:150 6:859
r1;::;r7 = 1:2 :000 :000 :061 0:836 2:443 4:433 6:367
Table D2. Weight on the true value in the pricing equation (zt).
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Baseline :000 :004 :053 :173 :351 :570 :784
￿ = 1:5 :100 :189 :299 :428 :572 :726 :852
￿ = 1:5 :001 :028 :110 :238 :405 :603 :806
￿ = 3 :000 :018 :119 :294 :472 :595 :699
K = 0:0075 :000 :000 :014 :102 :272 :505 :756
r6 = 1:2 :000 :000 :026 :133 :318 :557 :786
r1;::;r7 = 1:2 :000 :000 :002 :065 :260 :523 :768
Table D3. The coe¢ cient of the supply shock in the pricing
equation (zs;t)
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Baseline 4:1 ￿ 1019 4:2 ￿ 109 41623 131 7:40 1:71 :69
￿ = 1:5 2:2 ￿ 1032 7:4 ￿ 1015 4:3 ￿ 107 3282 28:6 2:66 :71
￿ = 1:5 3:8 ￿ 1027 3:1 ￿ 1013 2:8 ￿ 106 832 14:4 1:88 :59
￿ = 3 18:07 3:88 1:80 1:18 :86 :61 :39
K = 0:0075 8:8 ￿ 1021 6:1 ￿ 1010 1:6 ￿ 105 257 10:4 2:05 :78
r6 = 1:2 2:2 ￿ 1017 3:3 ￿ 108 12919 80 6:35 1:74 :69
r1;::;r7 = 1:2 7:7 ￿ 1011 9:8 ￿ 105 1006 29 4:60 1:61 :72
22Table D4. The equilibrium prices of risky assets with true values
￿ = 1:2.
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Baseline 1:000 1:001 1:011 1:035 1:070 1:114 1:161
￿ = 1:5 1:020 1:038 1:060 1:086 1:114 1:146 1:176
￿ = 1:5 1:000 1:006 1:022 1:048 1:081 1:121 1:163
￿ = 3 1:000 1:004 1:024 1:059 1:101 1:141 1:174
K = 0:0075 1:000 1:000 1:003 1:020 1:054 1:101 1:154
r6 = 1:2 1:000 1:000 1:005 1:027 1:064 1:112 1:161
r1;::;r7 = 1:2 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:013 1:052 1:105 1:158
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